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DAYDREAMS AND TRNSGRESSIVE WISHES
IN CONTEMPORARY SYRIA*
JOHN BORNEMAN 
Abstract:
Based on an analysis of dreams and daydreams of young Syrian men, this essay examines the fear 
of and desire for transgression of gender and genealogical taboos. Episodes of the use of Internet 
pornography, desires for humiliation, and anxieties about religious authority, violence, and sex 
suggest new kinds of global exchanges in intimacy, where the rules structuring paternity and gender 
no longer hold. The paper concludes with an argument about how a focus on the intersubjective, 
which accounts for the researcher in the situations studied, indexes wishes and fantasies about 
change, suggesting future communicative possibilities.
This essay presents three experiential episodes involving the activity of daydreaming and the state of 
reverie of young men in daily life that occurred during my ethnographic research in Aleppo between 
2004 and 2006.1 The episodes concern the use of Internet pornography, desires for humiliation, and 
anxieties about violence and sex, and point to the fear of and desire for transgression of gender and 
genealogical taboos among young Syrian men. The daydreams analysed are a particular subset of 
experiences from fi eldwork encounters that take place precisely because of the co-presence of the 
anthropologist. They do not refer us back to a distinct “local experience”2 of subjectivity, nor are 
they particularly interesting as products of dialogue or collaboration between the anthropologist and 
his interlocutors. Rather, they reveal the mutual imbrication of experience of both anthropologist 
and interlocutor and index wishes and fantasies about change, suggesting future communicative 
possibilities. They can form the basis for an alternative – third – understanding of a Syrian reality 
in which I also took part. I call this, following Thomas Ogden (1997: 9–11, 116–19), the experience 
of an “intersubjective third.” In the fi nal section of this paper, I suggest the benefi ts of this refl exive 
epistemology and the limits of an approach restricted to the depiction of public selves, opinions, or 
the so-called “Arab Street.”    
1. Episode One. Dream Collector
This fi rst episode involves interaction in the fall of 2004 with a merchant in the Souk al-Atarin 
(Borneman 2007: 115–16).
Majid calls me a dream collector because I make a point of asking people about their dreams. 
Freud famously defi ned dreams as the “fulfi llment of a wish,” and I see them as windows into 
complex motivations, how people envision their world, and what they generally want from it. 
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* The present contribution is based on a paper presented at the Institute for Social Anthropology of the 
Austrian Academy of Sciences, June 9, 2010. 
1 The episodes used in this essay are taken from my recent book, Syrian Episodes (Borneman 2007), 
based on fi eldwork in Aleppo, where I lived and did research in the ancient Souq al-Atarin and taught 
for a semester as a Fulbright Professor at the University of Aleppo.
  2 Although I do not follow Cliﬀ ord Geertz’s interest in isolating Syrian “culture” and the distinct subjec-
tivities of the other, I nonetheless share his goal of thick descriptions, to make “it possible to think not 
only realistically and concretely about them but, what is more important, also creatively and imagina-
tively with them” (Geertz 1973: 23).
Dreams are especially important for recording wishes that people are most reluctant to express 
openly to themselves or to others. Most people I ask say they cannot remember their dreams. 
Majid’s nephew, Mohammed, who assists him in the shop, says he remembers only the dreams 
that repeat. In one, he is licking a woman, sometimes even her feet. His uncle overhears him and 
says, “He asked for dreams, not nightmares!”
    The next day when I ask Mohammed again, he says, “I dreamt of having a knife and using it on 
my uncle Majid.” Mohammed also thinks by “dream” I mean simply what he wants, and whom 
he desires – whom among the customers that walk by he consciously desires. From his shop he 
yells after them: “Miss!” “Seniora!” “Fräulein!” “Mademoiselle!” “Seniorita!” “Madame!” 
Invariably the women he singles out are the older ones in the group, the grandmothers, who 
cannot believe this hunky, broad-shouldered twenty-year-old has his bright eyes on them, and 
then, as they walk away, he closes his eyes tightly and says wistfully, “My cup of tea.”
    I try to explain to Mohammed that I want not daydreams but dreams from his unconscious, 
from his sleeping hours, and he must remember or write these down as soon as he wakes. Majid 
dismisses my wish, “Mohammed only dreams during the day.”
   One late afternoon, as I prepare to leave his shop, Mohammed says, “I will dream for you 
tonight, perhaps not of women but of boys.” I reply, “Let yourself go in your dream, Mohammed, 
perhaps dream of goats or sheep. I don’t care.”
 “But I want to have a dream for you,” he says.
 “Don’t,” I reply.
    The next day, Mohammed greets me with a dream, “I was swimming naked. There were lots 
of people: boys, girls, women, men. And the water tasted like blood. What do you think?”
    “I don’t really know, Mohammed,” I say, “but perhaps you fear nudity, or the mixing of naked 
men and women, that it will result in violence.”
1.1 Interpretation of Episode One
In retrospect, what was Mohammed trying to tell me in his reverie about living between fanta-sy 
and reality? Mohammed’s uncle, Majid, initially dismissed what Mohammed told me as “day-
dreams,” and later, as “nightmares,” meaning they were not dreams in the night that express the 
unconscious.3 At the time I agreed with Majid, and asked Mohammed for a night dream. He did 
indeed eventually come back with a dream he had had the previous night, one where he was, 
fi rst, in water, swimming – one might say that he was contained, not free or fl oating, yet in a 
fl ow – but this water was dangerous, it “tasted like blood.” I must add here that water poses no 
danger to Mohammed. He is an excellent swimmer who prides himself on being the fastest in 
his family. The danger in the dream came from elsewhere, from the mixing of the generations 
and the two sexes. In other words, people were transgressing the two classic regulative social 
boundaries, which appear especially rigid for young men like Mohammed, but for adults are 
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  3 While night dreams have hallucinatory qualities and occur while asleep, daydreams are phantasies 
where something is consciously imagined while fully awake. Unlike night dreams, which involve re-
pression and where the motive must therefore be decoded from a distorted message, “the content of 
these phantasies [in daydreams],” observes Freud, “is dominated by a very transparent motive. They are 
scenes and events in which the subject’s egoistic needs of ambition and power or his erotic wishes fi nd 
satisfaction.” Daydreams share with night dreams the goal of “making the obtaining of pleasure free 
once more from the assent of reality” (Freud 1967: 120, 463).
essential structures of the everyday in Syria. So, in the dream, Mohammed is saying there is 
danger – symbolised by the water that tastes like blood – in the transgression of boundaries, 
especially those between women and men, but also between young and old. These are precisely 
the boundaries that Mohammed wishes to transgress, however, and in some sense which I, the 
unmarried, unattached adult stranger represent as transgressable. The fact that I represent this 
transgression in my own person and presence leads him to unconsciously symbolise these wishes 
in a dream he then remembers.
Mohammed’s wish for transgression is also the subject of his daydreams, of his moments of reverie, 
which I had not initially acknowledged as signifi cant. He imagines consciously killing his uncle 
with a knife or “licking a woman, sometimes even her feet.” These daytime imaginings are truly 
phantasmatic and pleasurable, as Mohammed can safely entertain such thoughts since it is highly 
unlikely he would carry them out. And he can safely share them with me, the anthropologist who 
seeks an empathic understanding of his motivations. But Mohammed’s nightdream, by contrast, 
is, as his uncle said, a nightmare, something he does not want to admit to himself and therefore 
feels compelled to repress; it expresses a horror scenario of confl ict latent in daily life but in 
which the nightmare actually situates him. In real time, there is the risk of blood. Mohammed 
is aware of confl icts in the souk, and of latent tension between the Sunnite majority, to which he 
belongs, and the ruling Alewite clan, although he never verbally addresses these issues. In real 
time, the women whom Mohammed pursues are often the older types, ones who could be his 
grandmother. Once two young French girls did seem very interested in Mohammed and one of 
his cousins, they spent many hours over several days visiting them in the souk, and on their last 
evening invited them to a cafe. They asked me and a couple other older cousins to come along. In 
the cafe, Mohammed was so incredibly shy, totally unlike his aggressive salesman persona in the 
souk, that he could hardly bring himself even to talk to the girls with whom he had boldly fl irted 
for several days.
One other important object to explain is the blood: where does it come from? What is its signifi cance? 
Mohammed himself is not injured, and he does not see himself as injuring anyone, and the mix of 
people in the water are also not themselves generating the blood. These liquids, water and blood, 
have nothing to do with the father, or with the father’s liquids – specifi cally, semen – and in this 
sense the substances he dreams of are not in the register of the Oedipal. They do not come about 
because of the presence of his father in mediating his relationship with his mother. The father or 
any symbolisation of him is in fact absent from the dream.
So we might assume that the water surrounding him, which he tastes, appeals to an oral register; 
it recalls that “oceanic feeling,” what Freud identifi ed as the register of the feminine. The water 
that tastes like blood is itself dangerous, for as much as Mohammed desires women, at base 
he fears being enclosed by them, or women come to symbolise his fears of social enclosure, 
perhaps because of his own personal phobias, but also because of the violence that might result 
should he act out his imagined transgressions. These tensions, between everyday violence and 
his own desires, fears, and phobias, are informed by the current sociopolitical context, by a 
formal calm undercut by an omnipresent anxiety about instability and change that shadows life 
in an authoritarian police state.
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2. Episode Two. Pornography
This second episode is taken from an encounter in January 2006 (Borneman 2007: 209).
In the early evening I join Majid in his shop in the souk. We gather his nephews together 
and walk to a new restaurant in an old villa that has been renovated on the edge of the souk. 
Actually, I very much enjoy the nephews, but more so one-on-one than as a group, when 
their behavior is ritualised and inevitably directed toward each other. All of them got new 
cell phones in the last year, and one shares with me the video clips he has downloaded onto 
his. His latest fi nd is of a woman wearing high heels stomping on the genitals of a naked man 
lying on his stomach. “Aaayyy,” I say, “please keep it for yourself. It pains me just to watch.” 
He chuckles and pushes another, similar clip in my face. I ask him if he identifi es with the 
man or the woman in the video. He simply laughs.
2.1 Interpretation of Episode Two
The man in this scene is Mohammed, again, who since Episode One has been serving his compul-
sory army duty, but during my visit was visiting Aleppo on furlough. Much is changing in Syria 
given the new ubiquity of cell phones and sexual imagery, as well as personal access to the Internet. 
My fi rst time in Aleppo, in 1999, there was one Internet cafe, and nobody I knew had Internet in 
their homes. In 2004, there were about fi ve Internet cafes and a few people had Internet connections 
at home. In 2006, all the middle class families I knew had home Internet connections, leading to 
the closing of one of the best known Internet cafes downtown. It is well known that the growth and 
expansion of the Internet worldwide has facilitated an intensifi cation of the circulation of sexual 
imagery. Today in many places the Internet also serves as a medium for setting up sexual liaisons, 
dates, or even marriages, that is, it facilitates already occurring social activity and exchange.
Equally if not more important, however, is the way the Internet facilitates privacy and new indi-
vidual consumption patterns; it encourages reverie, specifi cally in the domain of sex. It frees 
sexual activity from many of its social contexts and controls, putting these controls in the hands of 
individuals, while also changing the nature of sex itself by promoting auto-sexuality and fetishes. 
Such sexual activity lends itself uniquely to reverie because, as Ruth Stein (1998: 594–95) writes, 
sex oﬀ ers a “distinct feeling ... of stepping out of so-called ‘everyday mentality’ and habitual modes 
of functioning.” Sex, then, although both banal and repetitive, nonetheless creates the possibility 
for an experience that is a respite from the everyday in its phenomenal qualities of excess, enigma, 
abandonment and intensifi cation of self, and immersion in the other. Internet sex diﬀ ers from 
actual sex not in that it substitutes a phantasmatic object for other forms of sexual connection, but 
that on the Internet the phantasmatic object is merely an image – it allows a greater disconnect 
between materiality, the real, and the imagined. We might characterise Mohammed’s interest in 
this situation of extreme heterosexual excitement, where the woman’s sexuality is represented only 
by her high heel, and the man’s sexuality by his testicles, as an attempt to create an experience of 
aliveness that will disguise and partially substitute for the absence of such a sense in his everyday 
routines (Khan 1978). Mohammed, in other words, is showing me this image in an eﬀ ort to feel 
vital and alive by fi nding a comparable and substitute experience and relation to the intimacy he 
deeply desires but feels is unobtainable socially.
- 4 -
It is incontrovertible that today pornographic images on the Internet are infl uencing the desires 
of young men and women, in Syria as elsewhere in the world. The question is how to understand 
this, what kinds of transformation of self and its relation to others is taking place?  In 1962, the 
anthropologist Geoﬀ rey Gorer (1962: 193) argued that only with literate societies does pornography 
appear, and by pornography he means “the description of tabooed activities to produce hallucination 
or delusion.” Obscenity, Gorer maintained, can be found in many non-literate societies, but 
obscenity is social, it has to do with the sharing of sexually indecent or oﬀ ensive depictions. It is, 
as Robert Stoller (1985: 90) writes, “a planned assault on an audience.” Pornographic literature, by 
contrast, is to be read in private, and is therefore an enjoyment without the need for an audience.
This distinction between the obscene and the pornographic helps make some sense of Mohammed’s 
experience of the sex video. Above all, unlike with obscenity, which he uses in front of everybody, 
he does not share his pornographic experience widely, and therefore it tends to isolate him in his 
reverie. This relative isolation from the social makes his experience of pornography subversive. 
Masud Khan (1978: 221) makes this case for pornography generally: it “neither draws upon nor 
extends the reader’s imagination and sensibility; it oﬀ ers him/her a limited world of omnipotent 
verbiage, insinuated and fabricated as somatic events, with their built-in faked climaxes and 
orgasms, at which the accomplice can feel both complacent and excited.” The wish to feel both 
complacent and excited is a very modern one, which Khan explains in the following historical 
narrative, “With the industrial revolution and the advent of scientifi c technology in European 
cultures, man began to consider himself neither in the image of God nor of man, but in that of a 
machine which was his own invention; and pornographic écriture and imagery try to make of the 
human body an ideal machine, which can be manipulated to yield maximum sensation” (226). Its 
one perhaps positive eﬀ ect, he argues, is to “transmute rage into erotic somatic events” (223).4
Over thirty years have passed since Khan wrote this, and today on the Internet it is not merely or 
mostly words but above all images, montages not mediated by written folklore or mythology, that 
circulate for private consumption, that simulate erotic somatic events. Syrians generally, outside of 
the Alewite sect, are deeply religious people, though not as pious as most people in other parts of 
the Arab world. But one eﬀ ect of the secularism nourished by the Ba’thist regime of Hafez el-Asad 
has been to challenge religious dominance at the local level, including in the domains of gender 
and sex. It also directly limited, often forcefully, expressions of religiosity in public and private, 
often creating the resistance it was attempting to eliminate. It was not Mohammed’s generation, 
however, but those of his father and grandfather that experienced the brunt of this force, including 
the response to the Islamist uprising of the late 1970s, organised by the Muslim Brotherhood: the 
1982 massacre in the city of Hama. At that time, the Aleppian souk where Mohammed’s family 
works was also surrounded by tanks and attacked. This massacre remains a strong collective 
memory for Mohammed, though he is discouraged from bringing it into speech (Borneman 2009). 
There is talk of a rapprochement between secular and religious forces under the leadership of 
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  4 Khan (1979) builds on Freud’s thesis that the fetish develops out of an Oedipal dynamic in which it 
serves as a substitute for the mother’s penis that the boy once believed in but does not want to give up. 
Rage is a reaction to a central castration anxiety: the boy’s dread of and rage at his father’s penis, and 
frustration at the futility of his eﬀ orts to satisfy his mother and soothe her fears that he will abandon 
her. If, in light of his (failed) attempt at restitution, his mother does not provide him with suﬃ  cient 
space for emotional and developmental needs, he ends up surrendering to her moods and seductions. 
Consequently, he creates a space for himself as a separate self in reverie that feeds oﬀ  primarily mas-
turbatory fetishes.
Hafez’s son, Bashar el-Asad, who took over after his father’s death, on June 10, 2000. But the 
Internet revolution being experienced by Mohammed largely bypasses this rapprochement and the 
infl uences of secular and religious forces altogether.
Mohammed is a Sunni Muslim but he also comes from a family of merchants, and since child-
hood his immersion in the rationalising practices of economic activity, his adaptation to the 
modular relation of customer to seller and the commodity form, is perhaps his dominant mode of 
relating to the object world in the everyday. This mode of relating has nothing to do with Allah or 
Islam or religious experience. In interactions with me, Mohammed would frequently switch into a 
mercantile mode if I showed any interest in objects in his shop, and the next day he would express 
regret or embarrassment about having put pressure on me to buy things.
The mercantilism of the everyday and Mohammed’s daily involvement in commodity exchange 
with customers embeds him in social networks that make the experience of viewing pornography 
in the souk less isolating than Gorer or Khan might assume about the reading of pornographic 
literature at home. His activity is less as private reader than as viewer in a network of erotic image 
exchange. If he is isolated, it is only from some of his immediate kin and in his auto-erotic sexual 
practices. At the level of fantasy, he is fully “wired,” as we say –– he did indeed obtain these 
images electronically from some anonymous others and he shares these images with me, and likely 
with select other boys and men.
He discovered the activity of downloading pornography in free time with his army buddies, 
with whom he relates in what he describes as a very relaxed atmosphere. Once he completed 
basic training, he explained to me that in the barracks he had little to do but sit around, smoke 
the narghile, and play cards. The food is cheap and bad, however, so out of sympathy for him, 
Mohammed explained to me, his commanding oﬃ  cer lets him and others take frequent, relatively 
long, unscheduled leaves. Smoking the narghile – an activity that used to be largely restricted to 
adult males but is now practiced by both women and men across generations – is for Mohammed 
a habit. In the souk he gathers the coals and lights the water pipe ritually around three in the 
afternoon. It disposes him to what Wilfried Bion (1962) calls an “unconscious state of receptivity,” 
that is, he frequently gives himself over to reverie, and the narghile helps sustain this state. This 
reverie does not take him in the direction of contemplating god, piety, and the sacred, however, but 
to imaginings of sex, domination, and humiliation. In this way the downloading of pornographic 
images is an activity that feeds Mohammed’s various dream states freed from a strong reality 
principle, allowing him to remain complacent about his reality and to be excited simultaneously.
That Mohammed did not respond to my question with whom he identifi ed on the video, the female 
sadist or her male victim, suggests an emotional ambivalence. Mohammed probably identifi ed 
with the entire situation and its ambiguity. On the one hand, he probably empathised strongly with 
the male victim. His father and grandfather are very successful businessmen, but gentle men, not 
tyrannical fathers; over nine months in my nearly daily presence I never once heard them raise 
their voices to their sons. Among his more than twenty fi rst-cousins, Mohammed is known as the 
one with the biggest heart, always helpful and giving to others; yet he is frustrated by imagining a 
life permanently tied to his family and the shop in the souk. From this basically passive position, 
Mohammed probably empathised with the man who is getting his balls stepped on by a sexy lady.
On the other hand, knowing that his language is fi lled with obscene foreign words and that his 
humor tends toward the lewd and risqué, I suspect he found the aggression of the castrating woman 
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funny and titillating. The world in which he works – his twelve-hour, six day work weeks in the 
souk – is totally male except for many of the customers. His large family, like the other proprietors 
in the souk, does not allow female members of the family to work with or even visit them on the 
job. Most of his female kin, including his mother, stay at home; those who work do so for other 
employers in other parts of the city, certainly not in any of the many traditional Aleppian souks.
These women – grandmothers, mothers, sisters, sisters-in-law, aunts – cook for the men at night 
and take care of them all day on Fridays. They compete for the attentions of the men and boys. In 
Mohammed’s family, they have much power in the domestic sphere, and his emotional dependence 
on them produces aggression against them. But they do not control the money that comes in, nor 
do they, as I mentioned, accompany their male relatives in the public sphere. Power over their 
sons or brothers is solely through seduction and emotion, and that is usually sustained through the 
cultivation of an oral tie: the love of cooked food. Some men I know in Aleppo continued eating 
their mother’s food many years into their marriage. Their wives have no chance for loyalty in this 
sphere; their best hope for attachment is by producing sons, the earlier in a marriage the better. 
So, for Mohammed, the woman in the video expressed his aggressive feelings in a way similar to 
the taste of blood in his dream in episode one. She made, in the words of Robert Stoller (1985: 90) 
“excitement out of boredom [by] introducing hostility into fantasy.” The desire to humiliate is an 
essential theme of erotic play, but what is signifi cant in this case is that Mohammed was humiliating 
himself, not the woman. The video-woman with heels was admittedly going to extremes to get 
some attention, inverting the usual male/female romantic hierarchy by playing the active role. But 
also, the man in the video was being punished, and Mohammed thinks this punishment plausible 
if not also pleasurable and deserved, above all for fantasies of transgressions that might subvert 
women’s power over him.
3. Episode Three. “The religious people see this and hate it, but they cannot turn it oﬀ ”
My third episode is from a late evening in 2005, in a hammam with Basil, a very secular, Alewite 
man, advanced student of law and international relations at the time. He proposed to go to the 
hammam quite late at night, and I readily agreed, as I thought it would be an adventure. But when 
we got there, Basil said he came only because he had run out of cigarettes. He was interested only 
in buying cigarettes and smoking, not in going into the baths themselves, and he refused to go 
further than the waiting room. He proposed I go in, however, and he would wait for me in the area 
where one cools oﬀ . The events below follow conversations and interactions I had in the baths, 
described in the book, while Basil waited (Borneman 2007: 79–80).
Basil is whiling away his time, drinking tea, watching television, bored, I am sure, but not 
much bothered by that, and he still has not smoked though he now has cigarettes. He reiterates 
his dislike for Syrian tradition. On the television is one of the ubiquitous Arab MTV-like 
stations, which is playing an Arab rock video that Basil says is the fi rst import from the new 
Iraq. The lead dancer is a tall, leggy blonde (dyed hair, of course), and the camera darts back 
and forth from her legs to her long golden hair. When it pauses in the middle, she shimmies 
her ample breasts. The scenes of the video are cut to a quick tempo, and they become most 
frenzied in the whirr of her hair, which she aggressively and wildly fl ings around like the spin 
cycle of a washing machine. Nearly all such videos focus on a romantic encounter of man 
and woman. In this one, the leggy blonde is there to be seduced by the lead singer, a man, of 
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course, who is older than her, fat, and remains fully clothed except for the few top buttons of 
his shirt that reveal a hairy chest. She – this modern, fully made-over fi gure – is the point of 
identifi cation for the audience; she is the audience to be seduced by the singer and his love 
ballad. In other words, Tradition is to seduce the Modern. 
   “This is the new Iraq,” declares Basil, with an ironic chuckle. “The religious people see 
this and hate it, but they cannot turn it oﬀ . They like to watch it, but it makes them angry. 
That is our problem. There is no in-between. Either this, or tradition. I hate Syrian tradition, 
especially the traditions that divide the sexes.”
3.1 Interpretation of Episode Three
This episode brings us another step closer to seeing how attention to reverie, attention to inattention, 
contributes to understanding the relation of fantasy to a sense of reality in contemporary Syria. 
One of the things that Basil cannot have and wants is also what Mohammed cannot have and 
wants: freedom to converse with women his own age. What I had relegated to whiling away time 
and boredom was actually a state of absorption or pre-occupation, which led to Basil’s amazing 
insight about the inability of traditional cultural frames to help him incorporate the seductions of 
the modern, and about the ambivalence produced in what he calls “religious people,” who detest 
these seductions but are unable to say no to them.
Basil’s framing brings to mind a conversation I had in 2006 with a young soldier on furlough from 
the army. I met on a bus from Homs to Aleppo (Borneman 2007: 204). He was studying to be an 
imam at the prestigious al-Azhar University in Cairo, and because of this study, he explained to 
me, and because he is Sunni Muslim, he had just spent two months in the brig. “But what was the 
actual oﬀ ense?” I asked. He explained that the authorities discovered some email addresses of 
foreigners in his address book. Soldiers are forbidden contact with foreigners. He reminded me, 
jokingly, that our conversation is prohibited. I asked him about al-Azhar University, and he said he 
liked it very much; the authorities are very relaxed, he can travel a lot in Egypt. He asked me if I 
knew Pamela Anderson. “From Baywatch?” I asked. “She is,” he said, “our Greatest Temptation.”
Basil wants intimacy with women – public dating, touching, friendship, romance, Great Temptation 
– but he is not demanding sex, at least not immediately. In this wish, he is not so diﬀ erent from the 
several generations of uncles and brothers-in-law older than him, even though much has changed 
in the conditions of growing up in Syria in the last thirty years. And much has changed in the last 
decade. For one, there is the intensifi ed exchange of images discussed in Episode Two, which not 
only encourages fantasies about the ideal human body manipulated to yield maximum sensation, 
but also the transgression of the sexual and generational boundaries that regulate the social. This 
new circulation of images and the wishes that grow out of their consumption are accompanied by 
anxieties about thoughts of transgression. These anxieties remain largely unspoken, and there is no 
institution at present able to allay the accompanying unease.
Add to this the fact that the overwhelming majority of young Syrian men want to leave the country. 
Given the high level of endemic corruption and rigid social hierarchies that block occupational 
access and mobility, they see no economic future for themselves. The wish to leave one’s country – 
true for both Mohammed and Basil – is a radical and desolate response to a sense of confi nement 
and lack of opportunity. Syrians strike me as very patriotic about their country and chauvinistic 
about their culture. After reading on the Internet the fi rst few pages of Syrian Episodes, where I 
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describe the experience of dust and clamor in the souk, two young men I got to know well sent 
me an email that reads in part, “We are shocked. I want to tell you something, Mr. John, which 
is, you didn’t see anything about our great city, Aleppo. I think that you have to live ten years at 
least in our city to get an idea about what you were going to write about.” Such civic pride in place 
and tradition is a general Syrian sentiment. But the traditions that they respect, including religious 
traditions, as Basil suggests, oﬀ er an inadequate and unsatisfying response to some of the siren 
songs of modernity that they hear and see. These modern seductions – wishes for romantic love, 
sex, political freedoms, and status consumption – are not outside Syria, even though some people 
may associate them with the West. They have already been introjected by Syrians, including by 
the political and religious elites. They have already become integral to the Syrian subject, which 
means that idolised internal voices are speaking to them about attractions and fantasies that they 
feel obliged to contain or repress.
4. The Intersubjective Third, Public Space, Opinion
To this point, my argument has been twofold: fi rst, that paying attention to the intersubjective, to 
how knowledge of the other is obtained in fi eldwork interaction (in this case, by the joint creation 
of an intersubjective third), can lead to insights about alternative senses of reality; and second, that 
attention to the phantasmatic (in this case, to daydreams and states of reverie), indexes domains of 
experience and wishes that are future-oriented and hard to access through more usual approaches 
to attitudes, opinions, and everyday life. In this fi nal section, I want to briefl y discuss why this kind 
of epistemology has been ignored in studies of the Middle East, and how it addresses some of the 
shortcomings of the study of shared public space or the “Arab Street.”5   
The notion that scholars can stand in an unmediated and disinterested relation to those things and 
persons they describe is now, at least in anthropology, generally dismissed as naive objectivism. 
  5 The Arab Street as a concept has a history, of course, becoming popular in the long period of decolo-
nisation during the Cold War. Even before its popular dissemination, the street in its many references 
was essential to anticolonial and national independence movements in the 1930s and 1940s. It reached 
its fullest expression as opinion and action in the mid 1950s under the pan-Arabist leadership of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, whose legitimacy stemmed in part from the way he could summon crowds, and not only in 
Egypt, to support revolutionary – socialist, anti-imperialist – goals. At one point “Nasserism” culminated 
in protests in six Arab countries – protests that opposed the oﬃ  cial politics of their governments – in sup-
port of Nasser’s resistance to the British, French, and Israeli attempt to retake militarily the Suez Canal.
    In this same period, up until the 1970s, democratic socialist and communist movements acted to 
further local goals, such as the right to organise politically, to strike, to protest. Arab governments 
subsequently squashed these rival secular movements and imprisoned their leaders, tarring them as 
pro-Western. With this repression, the social forms in which analysts had understood opinion and ac-
tion diversifi ed and became more diﬃ  cult to measure. Also, governments increasingly adopted oﬃ  cial 
“anti-Zionist” ideology as a substitute for any real social programs (in the fi elds of transportation, 
education, or health, for example) to unite their disparate peoples. With the decline of Nasserism in the 
Middle East, some of the power vacuum was fi lled by Islamism in its two dominant forms, by the Gulf 
States, whose absorption of laborers, fi nanced by their oil wealth, resulted in a steady fl ow of remit-
tances back to home countries, and by the revolutionary Islamist ideology oﬀ ered by Iranian leaders.
     The Arab Street, then, was always associated with popular social movements, resistance, follower-
ship, and leadership. Since the death of Nasserism, however, the Arab world lacks any central leader-
ship or resistance. It resembles a horde of brothers struggling with each other for ascendancy, with no 
single father or source of authority, each brother, or autocrat, unwilling to yield to the others. Islamist 
groups, which are largely directed against these formerly revolutionary but now autocratic, corrupt 
governments, replicate the pattern of the secular or monarchic authorities from which they try to 
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Edward Said was not the fi rst scholar to make this important criticism of writers of the Middle 
East. In his words (1979: 21), the “strategic location [is] premised upon exteriority. What he says 
and writes ... is meant to indicate that the Orientalist is outside the Orient, both as an existential 
and as a moral fact.” That is to say, the Orientalist writes as if he is outside the Orient, whereas 
he is not. This criticism has frequently metamorphosed into another, however, into an accusation 
of Orientalism, – prejudicial outsider interpretations of Eastern cultures and peoples. This second 
point also draws its inspiration from Said (1979: 3, 6), from his argument that Orientalism is “a 
style of thought” that essentialises diﬀ erences into “a system of knowledge about the Orient, an 
accepted grid for fi ltering through the Orient into Western consciousness.”
The accusation of Orientalism, especially if leveled against what the intellectual historian Joseph 
Masad labels “Western, male, white-dominated” authors, has had the perverse eﬀ ect of eviscerating 
the very possibility of a location for this sociological category of researcher’s desires and interests 
within the East. For, if the researcher is Western and identifi ably Male, his “strategic location” 
is no longer merely “premised upon exteriority” but in fact assumed to be necessarily always 
outside the East, and therefore through absence of any possibility of interiority incapable of a 
non-prejudicial interpretation of the East. Some analysts have indeed confused the premise of 
exteriority with an empirical location that is exterior. The anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod (1991), 
for example, famously locates herself empirically as a “halfi e,” both inside and outside the East.6 
Masad (2002), for his part, both situates Western male desire as outside “the Arab world” while 
relegating the relation of his own location to desire to the closet. Moreover, he appears to exonerate 
perpetrators of sexual violence within Arab countries by claiming that such violence is a reaction 
to and product of Western discourses.7 
distinguish themselves. The use of the term “brotherhood” also suggests this line of interpretation at 
the linguistic level – as in Huquq al Ukhuwa (the rights of brotherhood) or as in Muslim Brotherhood, 
the greatest organised threat to these autocrats. Lacking a single authority or any distinct nationalist 
movements following the success of the anti-colonial movements, people have successively turned to 
pan-Arabism and Islam as surrogate totems.
   6 Abu-Lughod (1991: 37, 46, 47) draws upon the idea that a style like Orientalism “fi xes diﬀ erences 
between people” in the same way “culture … enforce[s] separations that inevitably carry a sense of 
hierarchy.” She claims to unsettle these diﬀ erences, largely because her location – a “halfi e [of] mixed 
national or cultural identity” – is both inside and outside the Orient. Traditional anthropology, she ar-
gues, by contrast, is involved in othering, caught up in the relationship between the West and non-West, 
and implicated in “Western domination.” In these criticisms, she generalises to “culture” Said’s second 
point, of “Orientalism” as a “style of thought” that essentialises diﬀ erences. But by positioning herself 
as both inside and outside the Orient, she both reinscribes the diﬀ erences between the two and misses 
his fi rst point, that this outside is only hypostacised, and as if location.
   7 To be sure, Masad (2002) is correct in following Foucault when he insists that there is no necessary 
logic whereby homosexual practices result in a gay subjectivity. However, it is incorrect to equate 
human rights activists with a coherent Western society that is opposed to an (unchanging, or highly 
resistant to change) Arab society. Arab societies, like others, are heterogeneous, marked by internal 
confl ict and ambivalence about their own normative frameworks. His attack on what he calls “the 
gay international”, is premised on an essentialisation of the positions inside and outside, reducing all 
experiential encounters to power alone, and assuming that the West’s power is always superior to that 
of Arab societies. When Masad (2002: 37) argues that Western activists “incite discourse about ho-
mosexuals where none existed before,” he mechanically applies a simplifi ed version of Foucault (that 
naming alone constitutes a subjectivity) to a dehistoricised situation, while claiming to do the opposite. 
In this, he reinstantiates and stabilises the Oriental/Occident binary which was the subject of Said’s 
critique. See the critique of Masad by Whittaker (2009).  
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One of the eﬀ ects of the fear of the accusation of Orientalism is to avoid arriving at some under-
standing of a changing psyche or interiority among Arabs, and instead to focus on surface pheno-
mena – opinions, the Street, public space. My attempt here has been to access this inner life 
through intimate exchanges at the conscious and unconscious levels – dreams, daydreams, wishes, 
the phantasmatic, or notions of selfhood not visible to or even denied by the actors themselves – of 
everyday experiences that are usually not paid attention to in research.
In studies of public space in Arab countries, of which there have been many, or inferences about 
“the Arab Street,” there is often little concern for the actual sensual experience of these spaces. 
Arabs are either represented only through the material objects they produce, or in the spaces 
they move or the discourses about them, or, when Arabs appear as persons, they become overly 
rational people with little humor and an exaggerated imagination for violence, largely determined 
by interactions with Western domination. My focus on the relation of daydreaming to the Syrian 
sense of reality is meant as a contribution to rebalance the picture.
What of the Arab Street? First, a short anecdote: a Jordanian friend living and teaching in 
Australia visited me in 2008 in Princeton. She grew up in a small town in Niedersachsen in 
central Germany, was educated in universities in Berlin and Australia, and is now a specialist on 
Australian aboriginal kinship. When I mentioned I was writing about the Arab Street, she told me 
how her aunt, who lives in Pasadena near Los Angeles, recently complained to her that when she 
walks up and down the beautiful and clean street in her neighborhood, she meets nobody. But in 
Amman, Jordan, in each walk she would have been invited for coﬀ ee a half dozen times, heard 
all the local gossip of the neighborhood about kin and friends and neighbors, and had discussions 
about the news of the larger political world. On the street in L.A., there is no kinship, no politics, 
no sharing of information or opinion, no argument, no interest in agreement or disagreement. The 
street in Amman, to put it succinctly, is a vibrant space for encounter, conversation, interaction, for 
the formation of a public, while the street in L.A. is a fairly anonymous place of isolated monads 
where there is little communicative exchange.
I could repeat this comparison many times, and contrast the experience of streets in Aleppo, 
Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, Rabat, Tunis, Sana’a, with American cities – and the diﬀ erence will 
hold up. So, why then does an empirical version of how the street is lived and experienced rarely 
enter into scholarly or journalistic interpretive frames? My argument is that the term “the Arab 
Street” is useful for projective identifi cation: to attribute agency to a wide range of subjects either 
as what most Western observers wish were the case in their own depoliticised, apathetic streets, or, 
alternatively, as a metaphor to frame an intuition or imagination. The Arab Street is phantasmatic 
like the daydream, never really about the empirical street.8 
Use of “the Street” is often justifi ed as a substitute, the next best thing, for reliable macro-polling 
data in the Arab world that might be analogous to the West’s notion of “opinion” or “popular 
will.” (Although, of course, some of this data does exist, produced by Arabs themselves, like 
    8 Both of these responses characterise the most widely read user of the street-as-metaphor, not an academic 
but journalist, the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, who, when not marketing his metaphor 
of the “fl at world,” hammers away on the Arab street as infl amed, radical, anti-American, anti-modern or 
not-yet-modern, afraid or unwilling to speak up, behind, catching-up, or, my favorite, a “frostbite victim 
thumb-wrestling with the hand of fate upon the scorching sands of international opinion.” It is unlikely, 
however, that people like Friedman who write and talk with such authority about “the Arab street” would 
admit to free association and disregard for empirical reality.
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Daoud Kuttab or James Zogby.) Voices from the street, conventional wisdom goes, are necessary 
to contrast with the voice of government or of formal political institutions, which, in all Arab 
countries, being notoriously autocratic, prevent anything resembling an authentic process of 
opinion formation.
Accordingly, because the Arab subject has few public forums in which to express itself, he (the 
street is usually male) is often represented as angry but passive, repressed politically but aggressive 
personally (especially against Arab women), and irrationally anti-American and anti-Israeli if not 
anti-Western generally; or, alternately, among a small, sympathetic, but ultimately patronising group 
of analysts, the Arab subject is represented as rational, tolerant, motivated by justice (especially 
for the Palestinians) or by the tenets of Islam, someone who seeks voice in a democratic sphere. In 
either view, “the Arab street” is always phantasmatic, a purely subjunctive entity: what one thinks 
or hopes the “public sphere” in the Arab world would be if the undisclosed, popular wishes of 
the masses could be heard; the street is what cannot be seen or heard in public but if seen would 
nonetheless be analogous to Western notions of “public opinion.”
“Opinion,” however, does not have the same referent or hold the same value in the Arab world 
today as it does in Euro-American ideology. This is so not only because Middle Eastern tribal 
and religious loyalties are much more stable and consistent than comparable loyalties in the Euro-
American world (where people choose and change religions, political parties, even gender), and 
therefore such belongings shape individual orientations in a way no “opinion” could capture; but 
also, because the assumed modes of Euro-American action and mobilisation – demonstration, 
resistance, voting, voicing abstract freedom – are not given the same valence in the Arab world.9
Much of the valence given to opinion in the West and elsewhere is due to its importance for 
democratic decision-making, for which there are very few forums in places where authoritarian 
regimes rule. In the West, the idea of democratic decision-making and autonomous opinion for-
mation, extends well beyond the political sphere to decisions in the workplace, in schools, and even 
in families. In these settings, individual opinions are expected of people and indeed consistently 
produced. By contrast, such institutions in most of the Arab world do not demand of people opinions. 
They demand negotiation, obedience, compliance, but not opinions. Therefore, when analysts use 
polls, often along with formal interviews, to measure opinion regarding the various claims of anger, 
hatred, tolerance, or the like, their numerical representations of this subjunctive entity we call 
“the Arab Street” is the mere appearance of empiricism. Such analyses of opinion oﬀ er at best an 
indexical or mirroring relation to changing attitudes and loyalties, and lead to banal chicken-and-
egg kind of assertions, basically that opinion either precedes or follows thought and action.
In sum, the Arab Street is indeed a very active place of sensuous exchange and argument and 
decision, but not of opinion formation. But that Street makes visible only the surface selves of 
people, their public performances. Processes of subject formation – the inner world, confi gurations 
of wishes, tastes, desires, unconscious loyalties or hatreds, repressions – are not readily graspable 
or on display in public settings. Access to these processes usually requires some degree of trust 
  9 I do not mean here to posit an opposition between indigenous Arab forms and Western forms, or, as 
in the work of many post-colonial scholars, to invoke the general dominance of the West’s system of 
representation over the Orient. The West and much of what it represents are in fact already internal to 
large parts of the Arab world, as is Israel and its war on the Palestinians – in a way, for example, that 
Syria is not internal to the U.S. (Borneman 2003).
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and inter-subjective play. An approach that relies only on objectived opinions as indices of public 
selves, or on observation of public spheres without more intimate participation by the researcher, 
elides the entire process of thought and aﬀ ect formation, that which informs and motivates action 
and makes communication meaningful to the local actors.
This conclusion leads us back to the question of what the focus on daydreaming in the fi rst half 
of this paper might contribute to understanding motivation and meaning. All social science and 
humanities disciplines are interested in what is culturally signifi cant. And in the last twenty years we 
have had two world revolutionary events, along with many more localised dramas, that are forcing 
a restructuring of the culturally signifi cant. I am speaking of the revolutions of “1989” ending the 
Cold War, and the near collapse of the world economic system in 2008. The two disciplines most 
authorised to analyse these events – political science and economics – largely failed to anticipate 
them (though, perhaps, most of the scholars in these fi elds would claim otherwise). This colossal 
failure of the models of social science in particular might lead us to take up less rationalist modes 
of thought, such as experiences of the intersubjective third, that stay closer to experience-near 
knowledge, aﬀ ect, and meaning.
Attention to phantasma in states of reverie or dreams and its relation to the sensual experience of 
the everyday might better inform our understandings of the relation of subjectivity to public selves 
than the study of opinions or institutions divorced from the ambivalent meanings people invest in 
them. Especially in authoritarian states where the public is constantly being surveilled, relations 
between fantasy and reality are kept under cover, so to speak. Getting under this cover requires the 
kind of presence of fi eldwork and the development of trust through acute listening (Borneman and 
Hammoudi 2009: 1–24, 259–272). More curiosity about what we do not know, and more refi ned 
analytical concepts that try to incorporate the phantasmatic and the limits of what we can see, 
might make both the Syrian sense of reality, and our own models of reality, more reliable indices 
of what the future holds.
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